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The stock characteristics often used in securities litigation to assess market efficiency are 
dispositive indicators of reactivity to earnings announcements. Stocks with large capitalization, 
high trading volume, broad analyst coverage, a large number of market makers, and narrow bid-
ask spread are far more likely to react significantly to earnings announcements than stocks 
without these characteristics. Univariate and multivariate tests compel this conclusion, but 
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1. Introduction and scope 
The principle of market efficiency is of interest far beyond the arenas of finance academics who 
ask if only company fundamentals impact stock prices, and investment professionals and their 
clients who ask if the benefits of active management are worth the costs. Courts and lawyers are 
interested too. Market efficiency plays a pivotal role in class action securities litigation.  A typical 
class action securities case is one in which a company has allegedly made misrepresentations or 
omissions that artificially inflated the company’s stock price. When the truth emerges, the stock 
price falls and investors suffer losses. To prevail in litigation and recoup damages under U.S. 
securities laws, plaintiffs must establish that the subject security consistently reacts to new 
information, because that form of market efficiency links the alleged misrepresentations to the 
trading prices upon which investors relied. 
In the United States, a company that inflates its stock price with misrepresentations or omissions 
may be liable for damages to injured investors pursuant to the Exchange Act of 1934. However, 
pursuing a securities fraud claim against a public corporation is extremely expensive,1 while the 
potential recovery to an average investor is generally modest. To seek relief, investors band 
together and pursue their claims in a class action. 
In order for such a case to move forward, the court must certify a class of plaintiffs. The court will 
do so if trying the case on a class basis is deemed superior to each investor pursuing the case 
individually. Among the conditions required for class certification is proof that all proposed class 
 
 
1 For example, plaintiffs’ legal fees and expenses incurred in the Merck securities litigation that settled in 2016 totaled 
$232 million according to court filings (Wichert 2016). 
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members relied on the alleged misrepresentations. But, how can the court conclude that all 
investors relied on the misrepresentations when so many investors do not study company financial 
statements, monitor conference calls, or listen to company presentations? Many investors may not 
even know about the alleged misrepresentations. This question was addressed in the landmark 
Basic v. Levinson case of 1988. The Court ruled that when a security trades in an efficient market, 
such that the price of the security reflects all available information, the market price will also 
reflect the alleged misinformation. Because all investors rely on the market price when they 
transact, all investors indirectly rely on the misrepresentations. Establishing reliance through 
market efficiency is known as the fraud-on-the-market principle. 
The Supreme Court in Halliburton II (2014), citing Basic v. Levinson (1988), clarified what type 
and degree of efficiency are necessary to invoke the fraud-on-the-market principle: “For purposes 
of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, we need only believe that market 
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, 
thereby affecting stock market prices.” Fraud-on-the-market requires that the market for the stock 
be sufficiently well-developed such that material public information is not ignored, but rather is 
disseminated, digested, and traded upon, so that market prices reflect publicly available 
information.  
This informational efficiency, meaning that a stock absorbs and reflects new information, is 
distinct from the concept of fundamental efficiency, which requires that the prevailing stock price 
conforms at all times to a particular pricing model, typically a discounted cash flow model.2 That 
 
 
2 The distinction between informational and fundamental efficiency is addressed in Sharpe (1981), Tobin (1984), 
and Cornell and Haut (2019).  
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is, in the legal arena, plaintiffs need not prove the correctness of the market price, but rather that 
the market price absorbs and reflects new information. 
As evidence of informational market efficiency, courts welcome empirical tests that demonstrate 
a statistically significant cause-and-effect relationship between the release of company information 
and stock price movements. We define this statistically significant relationship as “stock price 
reactivity.”  Reactivity may manifest as either a change in the stock price or a change in the stock 
return distribution, e.g., its mean or volatility, in response to new information. 
For a variety of reasons discussed below, however, tests of reactivity may not be feasible or may 
not be informative. This is especially the case when the alleged fraud involves the company 
engaging in accounting fraud or making misrepresentations with the express intent of misleading 
investors to believe that the company met expectations so as to maintain the current stock price. 
Consequently, courts also consider other indicia of market efficiency aside from the direct 
evidence provided by empirical tests. 
The Cammer (1989) and Krogman (2001) courts, and numerous courts following their precedents, 
addressed certain factors that may evince market efficiency. In addition to direct empirical 
evidence demonstrating a cause-and-effect relationship between corporate disclosures and stock 
price movements, the Cammer court identified as acceptable indicia the following company and 
market characteristics: high trading volume, broad analyst coverage, a large number of market 
makers and/or a listing on a major exchange, and eligibility for S-3 registration (which requires a 
threshold market capitalization and a history of timely financial reports). The Krogman court 
added narrow bid-ask spread, large market capitalization, and high float as dispositive indicia.   
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While the academic literature is rich in research investigating the speed of price adjustment to new 
information, anomalies of apparent mispricing, the battle between the classical and behavioral 
paradigms, and the debate over whether markets are generally efficient or inefficient, there is less 
research into what company characteristics, if any, correlate well with stock price reactivity to 
information. Trading volume, market makers, exchange listing, and a narrow bid-ask spread may 
preclude trading impediments that could cause inefficiency, but are stocks with these 
characteristics more likely to react to information flow than those without?  Analyst coverage and 
large market capitalization may indicate that information about a company is readily available, 
and that there is widespread interest in the company, precluding information flow impediments 
that might otherwise cause inefficiency. But, are large stocks with widespread analyst coverage 
more likely to react to information flow than stocks without these characteristics? In sum, are 
stocks that satisfy the Cammer/Krogman factors more likely to exhibit significant reactivity than 
stocks without those characteristics? Our study aims to answer this question. 
As the main criterion for S-3 registration eligibility is a market capitalization threshold (originally 
$300 million, but lowered to $75 million in 1992), and market capitalization typically correlates 
with float, we focus on market capitalization as a single encompassing “size” factor standing in 
for the Cammer/Krogman factors of S-3 eligibility, market capitalization, and float. Therefore, to 
assess whether or not the Cammer/Krogman factors are dispositive of stock price reactivity, we 
examine five factors in this study: size, volume, analyst coverage, number of market makers, and 
bid-ask spread. Size is market capitalization. Volume is measured as average daily turnover (shares 
traded divided by shares outstanding), because turnover is the volume metric typically used in 
securities litigation. Analyst coverage is the yearly average number of analysts that reported their 
estimates to I/B/E/S preceding each earnings announcement. The market maker metric is the 
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average of the daily market maker participation figures reported by CRSP. Bid-ask spread is 
measured as the average end-of-day percent spread over the course of the subject year. 
Examining all CRSP stocks between 2012 and 2017, we find that 61% exhibit stock price reactivity 
to earnings announcements. That is, earnings announcements, compared to all other days, elicit 
significant stock price reactions with frequency that cannot be explained by random chance, but 
rather must evince reactivity to information. Reactivity is more likely (79%) among stocks that 
satisfy the Cammer/Krogman factors than among the total population (61%), and far more likely 
than stocks that do not satisfy the Cammer/Krogman factors (41%). Alternative tests to identify 
stock reactivity and alternative regression specifications obtain qualitatively the same results. 
Reactivity demonstrates that a stock’s price is impacted by information and is therefore evidence 
of informational efficiency. However, failure to find reactivity in a given sample does not 
necessarily prove inefficiency. Market inefficiency is, of course, a reason for a stock not to react 
significantly to an information event such as an earnings announcement, but there are other reasons 
why a stock might not react significantly. The event may have conveyed no news, or the news may 
have been of such modest nature that the appropriate stock price reaction was negligible.3 The 
information event may have contained countervailing positive and negative news. On the 
assumption that alternative explanations for apparent nonreactivity aside from market inefficiency 
are unsystematically distributed throughout the population of stocks, our findings that reactivity 
 
 
3 Screening the earnings announcements for surprises does not necessarily solve this problem, as a surprise in 
reported earnings is rarely the only material news in an earnings announcement. Earnings surprises are often 
countervailed by unexpected revenue, guidance, or other developments. Announcements of in-line earnings often 
also contain highly positive or negative news unrelated to the earnings. Therefore, big earnings surprises might elicit 
no reaction, while in-line earnings may elicit a significant reaction. Moreover, a stock may be so intensively 
researched that reported results and material developments are fully anticipated by the time of the announcement. 
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correlates with the Cammer/Krogman factors also indicate that the Cammer/Krogman factors may 
be indicators of informational market efficiency. That is, large, actively traded stocks, with broad 
analyst coverage, numerous market makers, and narrow bid-ask spreads are more likely to trade 
efficiently than stocks without these characteristics. 
2. Assessing market efficiency in securities litigation: a literature review 
Following Fama (1991), event studies have become a standard empirical test of market efficiency. 
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, Chapter 4) present a useful description and examples of the 
methodology and write about how it is generally accepted and widely used in academic research.  
Gold, Korman and Nabi (2017) write about how the methodology is applied in forensic 
applications. Forensic analysts identify a collection of events that, based on valuation principles, 
reasonably ought to elicit statistically significant stock price reactions. They then run standard 
event study tests on each of the selected events. Significant abnormal returns on event dates 
demonstrate stock price reactivity. Brav and Heaton (2015) contrast the single-security event 
studies employed in securities litigation with the multi-security cross-sectional event studies in the 
academic literature, noting the methodological differences and lower power of single-security 
event studies. Fisch and Gelbach (2020, pp 1) further study “the tradeoff between power and 
confidence and the ensuing impact on the likelihood that valid claims of fraud will erroneously be 
rejected” and propose that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) play an active role in 
setting standards of statistical significance for event studies in security litigation rather than borrow 
them from the social sciences literature.   
Choice of events and the cutoff number of significant results to draw conclusions are often highly 
contested in the adversarial forensic forum. Addressing event selection and incidence rate, Ferrillo, 
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Dunbar, and Tabak (2004) developed a different empirical test for informational market efficiency, 
which evaluates events collectively. They define a category of news events to be tested, then they 
sort a company’s stock returns into two groups, one comprising the news days, and the other non-
news days. The news events may be earnings announcements, publication of news articles about 
the company, or filings of 8-Ks, for example. The group of non-news days may include some days 
with important information, albeit days that do not satisfy the criteria for inclusion in the defined 
news days sample. As such exceptional days included among the non-news days will reasonably 
be few, their impact will likely be diluted among the ordinary non-news days.  
Ferrillo et al. (2004) then estimate a market model to derive firm-specific abnormal returns, which 
are then tested for statistical significance. Finally, Ferrillo et al. (2004) conduct a two-proportions 
Z-test to ascertain whether the incidence of significant abnormal returns is significantly greater 
among the news days than among the non-news days.4 If this is the case, one can conclude that the 
stock reacts to news.  
Other studies of interest have examined the relationships between certain company characteristics 
and market efficiency, though they propose empirical proxies for market efficiency that differ from 
the earnings announcement reactivity test we use, and which is used in securities litigation. The 
factors examined in these studies overlap with the Cammer/Krogman factors. Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2008) found that narrow bid-ask spread is associated with less return 
predictability and, therefore, efficiency under certain conditions. Chung and Hrazdil (2010) 
 
 
4 We use a Fisher Exact test instead of the Z-test because the asymptotic properties of the standard normal Z-statistic 
may be called into question when the news day sample is small. Another approach when news sample size is small 
is to follow Hartzmark and Seyhun (2012) and use a bootstrap algorithm to estimate the test p-values and critical 
cutoff instead of calculating them with the Fisher Exact test. 
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investigate size and volume, finding volume to be inversely related to return predictability. Busse 
and Green (2002) found that smaller firms react more significantly to certain analyst commentary, 
which they conclude implies that smaller firms without analyst coverage might be less efficient.  
Barber, Griffin, and Lev (1994) is the first empirical investigation explicitly addressing the 
Cammer/Krogman factors as indicators of efficiency. Examining earnings announcements from 
all NASDAQ stocks over the period 1984-1990, they ranked each earnings observation by the size 
of the earnings surprise and by the size of the price response. They focused on the bottom and top 
quintiles of earnings surprises, i.e., events that were large earnings surprises in either direction. 
Extreme surprises that elicited extreme price responses were deemed “efficient.” If an extreme 
earnings surprise elicited only a middle quintile price response, they labeled the event response 
“inefficient.” Analyzing individually the company characteristics associated with efficient and 
inefficient events, Barber et al. (1994, pp 302) found that most Cammer/Krogman factors correlate 
with efficiency: “Consistent with the efficiency indicators used recently by the courts, the 
inefficient firms have lower mean trading volume, fewer market makers, lower analyst following, 
and lower institutional ownership (number and percentage) than efficient firms.” In a multivariate 
framework, however, Barber et al. (1994, pp 310) found that only volume and analyst coverage 
were significant indicators of efficiency: “Our findings, based on two models of expected earnings 
[…] clearly indicate two factors as efficiency drivers: volume of trade and number of analysts 
following the stock.” Further investigation and out-of-sample tests, such as ours in this paper, may 
illuminate whether their results are robust and which factors are truly most informative. 
There are some recent attempts at benchmarking Cammer factors and other indicators of efficiency 
for security litigation use. This line of research assumes that such indicators are indeed dispositive 
of efficiency and use the distribution of each indicator in a universe of stocks as a benchmark to 
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assess whether a particular stock lies within an acceptable region of efficient values for the 
indicator. Tabak (2019) benchmarks the Cammer factors by examining factor values among S&P 
500 stocks, suggesting that they are usually considered to be efficient. Tabak proposes that any 
other stock should be deemed efficient if its Cammer factor values, except size, were similar to 
levels found among the S&P 500. Bhole, Surana and Torchio (2020) provide benchmark Cammer 
factor values and propose other indicators such as level of institutional ownership, ability to sell 
short, and absence of serial correlation. Bohle et al examine all NYSE and NASDAQ stocks and 
propose that a factor for a stock is not supportive of a finding of efficiency if its value lies within 
the 10th percentile in the opposite direction of what conventional wisdom expects for efficiency. 
Our research provides empirical guidance as to what range of Cammer factor values are dispositive 
of a cause-and-effect relationship between information flow and stock price reaction; we let the 
data provide answers rather than assume an arbitrary threshold.   
Our paper follows the lead of Barber et al. (1994). We coincide in the use of earnings 
announcements as news events. Earnings announcements are a reasonable choice for a class of 
generally high information events that can be selected objectively. Ball and Brown (1968), Ball 
and Kothari (1991), Beaver (1998), and Patell and Wolfson (1984) provide evidence that the flow 
of company-specific information is generally elevated on earnings announcement dates. Choosing 
earnings announcements as the news events is not the only possible screening criterion to construct 
a group of high information days. However, as this study examines over a thousand stocks, over 
several years, it is the most feasible of objective screens. 
As did Barber et al. (1994), we examine the factors individually in univariate tests and also 
collectively in multivariate tests. In order to determine whether factor magnitudes matter, we 
compare reactivity rates among stocks grouped into factor quintile cohorts, we compare the factor 
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characteristics of reactive and nonreactive stocks, and we run multivariate logit regressions to 
determine which factors appear to drive reactivity. 
Our research differs from the seminal Barber et al. (1994) study in several ways. First, Barber et 
al. (1994) study stock price reactions only on event days, defined as days with extreme earnings 
surprises. They do not consider all earnings announcement days or any non-announcement day. 
Thus, their unit of study is an event-day stock return rather than a stock over a period of time. By 
contrast, our study considers both event days (all earnings announcements) and a control group of 
non-event days (all non-announcement days), scrutinizing reactivity at the stock level in a given 
year.  
Second, for categorizing a price response as efficient or inefficient, Barber et al. (1994) needed to 
assume that modest stock price reactions to extreme surprises were inefficient. By virtue of our 
focus on reactivity, an objectively observable property, we need not make such an assumption. We 
differentiate between reactive and nonreactive stocks based on three statistical tests that compare 
the price reactions on earnings days relative to all other days: 1) The Fisher Exact Test for 
difference in the incidence rate of significant returns; 2) an F-test for difference in return variance; 
and 3) the non-parametric test of Ansari and Bradley (1960) (Ansari-Bradley test). 
Third, to gauge earnings surprises, they focused only on the net earnings metric reported in 
earnings announcements, to the exclusion of other material company information such as EBIT, 
EBITDA, revenue, and guidance. Consequently, days that they characterized as big positive or 
negative surprises on the basis of reported net earnings, may have been mixed news when taking 
all other performance metrics and news into account. By examining news flow holistically, our 
study may provide additional insight. Our approach requires only that more information is reported 
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on earnings announcement days than ordinary days typically, a proposition well supported in the 
literature.5 Moreover, our findings about reactivity are of general interest independent of efficiency 
implications. For example, investors may be interested in how often earnings announcements elicit 
significant stock price reactions and how that frequency is tied to company characteristics.  
Fourth, we use all CRSP stocks, which data include NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. Barber 
et al. (1994) restricted their examination to NASDAQ stocks on the assumption that inefficient 
stocks are rare among NYSE stocks. Our data set has a wide range of factor values and still a 
substantial percentage of apparently nonreactive stocks. On account of our broader stock 
population, our study may provide more general conclusions.  
Fifth, we examine whether factor magnitudes correlate with reactivity to determine, for example, 
whether larger stocks are more likely reactive than smaller stocks. However, we also assess 
whether for each factor there may be some minimum threshold level that is dispositive of 
reactivity. For this threshold analysis, we use a logit regression specification that differs from that 
in Barber et al. (1994). We use binary indicator variables both for the dependent variable (whether 
a stock is or is not reactive) and for the explanatory variables (whether a stock has a factor value 
above or below a given threshold). Our approach produces marginal factor probabilities associated 
with each factor meeting or exceeding its respective threshold, and thereby investigates potential 
non-linear relationships between Cammer/Krogman factor values and reactivity.6 
 
 
5 See, e.g., Ball and Brown (1968), Ball and Kothari (1991), Beaver (1998), and Patell and Wolfson (1984). 
6 Marginal factor probability measures the contribution of each factor to reactivity, controlling for the other factors. 
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3. Research objective, data, and methodology 
3.1 Data 
We drew our data from the entire population of CRSP stocks for each year, 2012 to 2017, screening 
for the subset of stocks in each year for which I/B/E/S identified four earnings announcements in 
the respective year and for which all Cammer/Krogman factor data were available.7 We included 
only CRSP “code 11” stocks, i.e., ordinary common shares traded in United States markets, 
excluding mutual funds, ETFs, REITs, and ADRs. 
As our purpose was to test the relationship between the Cammer/Krogman factors and reactivity 
to earnings announcements, our study required screening for stocks for which all such data was 
available. Of the Cammer/Krogman factor data, only market maker data was occasionally 
unavailable, necessitating exclusion of stocks missing that data. About one-third of the stocks that 
passed the screen for four earnings announcements were eliminated on account of unavailable 
market maker data. The other Cammer/Krogman factors produced no operative constraint, as data 
for all other factors were available for all remaining stocks.  
As described below, to compute daily abnormal returns and determine when any particular 
abnormal return was statistically significant, we estimated market model rolling regressions with 
data preceding each particular day. In order to estimate an initial regression for the first trading 
day of the year under study, we required at least 125 daily return observations from the prior year. 
Most stocks had data for the full prior year, but some stocks did not have the minimum 125 
 
 
7 An earlier version of this study, conducted on data from 2012-2015, produced identical qualitative results. The 
consistency of the results from the expanded data set confirm that the results are robust out of sample. 
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preceding daily return observations sufficient to estimate the first rolling regression and so were 
excluded due to this data constraint.8 
Stocks indicated by CRSP as having zero market makers were included, but stocks for which 
market maker data from CRSP was unavailable were excluded. While market maker data 
unavailability could potentially introduce some degree of selection bias, we observe that our 
resulting data sample is both very large and comprises a wide range of Cammer/Krogman factor 
magnitudes. Missing observations do not eliminate any segment of the total stock population, e.g., 
small stocks or thinly traded stocks, and it is therefore unlikely that selection bias skews our results. 
As a robustness check, we repeated the analysis excluding stocks designated by CRSP as having 
zero market makers, and qualitative results were unaffected. 
We organized the data by stock and year. A “stock-year” observation describes the characteristics 
of a particular company in a particular year and its reactivity to earnings announcements in that 
same year. For each stock in each year, each factor value was calculated as the average for the 
year. The size of a company was measured as its average market capitalization over the course of 
the year. Volume is the average daily turnover for the given year, volume divided by shares 
outstanding. Average turnover is the volume metric generally considered in securities cases and 
discussed by legal commentators Bromberg and Lowenfells (1988), who were cited by the 
 
 
8 Abnormal return significance for all observations was determined out-of-sample using rolling regressions, which 
therefore required a sufficiently large sample of return data preceding each tested return observation. In a previous 
version of this paper, the initial daily returns from the start of any particular year were tested for significance based 
on in-sample regressions covering the first month of the year’s returns, while subsequent returns were tested out-of-
sample with regressions estimated on preceding data. At the suggestion of the referee, to be more consistent and 
reliable, we replaced the mixed methodology with uniformly out-of-sample rolling regressions. This adjustment 
required a screen for availability of a sufficiently long time series of return data preceding each tested stock return. 
With this change, qualitative results are identical to our original results, but more reliable with the consistent and 
more sound methodology.  
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Cammer court.9 To calculate average analyst coverage in each year, we examined the number of 
analysts who provided earnings forecasts in the last I/B/E/S survey preceding each earnings 
announcement and then averaged the four quarterly observations. The market maker factor was 
measured as the average of the daily market maker participation figures provided by CRSP. Bid-
ask spread for each stock was computed from end-of-day bids and asks reported by CRSP and then 
averaged for the year.  
In the 2012 database, we started with 3,415 CRSP stocks with “code 11.” Of those, 2,313 had all 
four quarterly earnings announcements reported in I/B/E/S with their respective dates identified. 
Of those, 1,500 had available all Cammer/Krogman factor magnitudes. Of those, 1,483 had 
available at least 125 return observations preceding the first trading day of 2012. We repeated this 
screening for each year’s data population, providing 1,480 stocks in 2013; 1,559 stocks in 2014; 
1,650 stocks in 2015; 1,326 stocks in 2016; and 1,565 stocks in 2017, which satisfy all data 
availability requirements. 
The general presumption about Cammer/Krogman factors is that larger size, higher volume, 
broader analyst coverage, more market makers, and narrower bid-ask spread are associated with 




9 In legal cases, the weekly average turnover is the volume metric used, which equals approximately our daily average 
turnover multiplied by 5. As they differ only by a scalar, daily or weekly turnover may be used. 
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3.2 Assembling the stock-year observations into Cammer/Krogman factor quintiles 
Each stock in each year is treated as one “stock-year” observation. Our dataset comprises 9,063 
stock-years. All stock-year observations are ranked into quintiles for each Cammer/Krogman 
factor. The quintile with the lowest values is designated the 1st quintile, while the quintile with the 
largest factor values is designated the 5th quintile.  
Market capitalization (size factor) ranges from $2.6 million to $780.7 billion with a median of 
$720.7 million. The lowest size factor quintile ranges from $2.6 million to $191.6 million, and the 
highest quintile ranges from $2.97 billion to $780.7 billion. Average daily turnover (volume factor) 
ranges from 0.0027% to 17.65% with a median of 0.66%. The lowest volume quintile ranges from 
0.0027% to 0.33%, and the highest quintile ranges from 1.26% to 17.65%. Analyst coverage 
ranges from 1 to 47.8 with a median of 5.5 analysts. The lowest analyst coverage quintile ranges 
from 1 to 2.5, and the highest quintile ranges from 12.0 to 47.8. The number of market makers 
ranges from 0 to 79.5 with a median of 41.6. The lowest market maker quintile ranges from 0 to 
26.8, and the highest quintile ranges from 51.3 to 79.5. Bid-ask spread ranges from 0.01% to 
13.21% with a median of 0.11%. The lowest bid-ask spread quintile ranges from 0.01% to 0.05%, 
and the highest quintile ranges from 0.41% to 13.21%. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, mean, and median) for each factor 
for the aggregated period of six calendar years (2012-2017). The data for each of the calendar 
years individually (not shown) is similar but exhibits expected sampling variation from year to 
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year. Since all of our tests are conducted on the aggregated six years of data, we present the 
summary statistics for the aggregate data in Table 1.10 
We determine the factor quintiles to which each stock-year observation belongs. For example, 
Veeco Instruments Inc. in 2016 belonged to the 3rd quintile for size, 3rd quintile for volume, 4th 
quintile for analyst coverage, 5th quintile for number of market makers, and 3rd quintile for bid-ask 
spread. 
3.3 Computing abnormal returns and testing for statistical significance 
For all stocks in all years, we test all daily returns for statistical significance using rolling 
regressions. That is, we estimate a market model regression for each daily return, using one year 
of daily preceding data and including the respective target date. Logarithmic stock returns were 
regressed on an intercept, logarithmic CRSP total market returns, and a dummy variable for the 
final stock return corresponding to the target date to be tested for abnormal return significance.11  
For each stock in each year, in this manner we conducted an out of sample test of significance for 
every trading day. Significance of the dummy variable would indicate that the target date abnormal 
return was statistically significant.12 
In some instances, for some stocks in some years, a full year of return data prior to the first 
observation of the year was unavailable. When that was the case, we used less than one year of 
preceding data to estimate the rolling regressions. However, we included only stocks for which at 
 
 
10 A table with descriptive statistics by year is available from the authors by request. 
11 To review the use of single-day dummies in regressions, see Binder (1998) for the case of event studies and 
Kennedy (2008) for a more general treatment. 
12 We use the asymptotic two-tail 5% significance level critical value of 1.96 for purposes of our study, recognizing 
that other significance levels may be appropriate in other applications. 
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least 125 days of prior data was available. We restricted our sample to those stocks that had at least 
125 days of prior return observations for the first regression of the year.13 We then increased the 
number of observations one at a time in each subsequent regression until we reached a full year of 
prior data. From that point on, we rolled the estimation window forward to maintain one-year 
regression estimation periods. 
Running rolling regressions for each stock-year eliminates any potential concerns about look-
ahead bias in the estimation of abnormal returns.14 It also mitigates the potential heteroskedasticity 
when testing the significance of all the events abnormal returns at once in a single regression. Our 
rolling regression methodology does not suffer from autocorrelation and potential consequent bias 
affecting inferences about the significance of abnormal returns. Although rolling regression 
coefficients (e.g. rolling market betas) tend to be autocorrelated, our event dummy coefficients 
(the abnormal returns) are one-step ahead out-of-sample forecast errors.15 Thus, the abnormal 
returns in our study are theoretically uncorrelated with past returns and prior information. To 
empirically confirm this property,16 we estimated each stock-year regression with a Newey-West 
AR(1) correction and used the standardized Newey-West t-statistics on the dummy coefficients to 
 
 
13 Our final sample has 9,063 stock-year observations, of which 8,479 (93.6%) have all 252 prior daily observations. 
Only 6.4% of our final sample has less than 252 prior daily observations, and by design, all of these have at least 
125 prior daily observations. 
14 We note that all qualitative results in our study are identical when we estimate all abnormal returns and associated 
standard errors for a given stock-year from a single calendar year regression, as explained in Binder (1988). If return 
dynamics are stationary, such that the regression coefficients are stable, then abnormal returns measured with rolling 
regressions will be virtually equivalent to those measured with a single common regression for a particular stock in a 
given year. 
15 See, e.g., Peter Kennedy (2008, pp 236-237): “When a regression is run with a period-specific dummy the 
computer can ignore the specific observation – the OLS estimates can be calculated using all the other observations 
and then the coefficient for the period-specific dummy is estimated as the value that makes that period’s error equal 
to zero. In this way, SSE (the error sum of squares) is minimized.”  
16 Or alternatively, that our results do not derive from any present autocorrelation. 
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test for significance of the abnormal returns. We repeated the Fisher Exact tests for reactivity using 
the Newey-West significance results and found the same qualitative results as when ordinary least 
squares (OLS) was used.17 As no autocorrelation is theoretically present, and the correction for 
autocorrelation has no effect on the study’s results, we employ OLS as the primary estimation 
methodology.18 
When identifying earnings announcement event dates, we were careful to take into account the 
time of day when the announcements occurred. For a release made after market hours or during a 
weekend or holiday, the next trading day is the operative event date. If the release was before or 
during market hours on a trading day, then that same trading day is the operative event date.  
Beaver (1968) and Brown and Warner (1985), among others, have expressed concern that the very 
events one wishes to test for significant stock reaction may induce volatility. They hypothesize 
that an event return may be large and may appear to be significant because the event increased the 
stock return volatility. Corrections proposed in the literature are applicable to cross-sectional event 
studies (Boehmer, Masumeci and Poulsen 1991; Corrado 1989). For our purposes of examining 
each individual firm’s reactivity, however, and for purposes of determining if there is a cause-and-
effect relationship between information and stock price movements, event-induced volatility need 
not be a concern. The concept of reactivity encompasses this potential effect. If a firm’s abnormal 
return observations are differentiated on the basis of there being an event or no event, and the event 
 
 
17 Both the aggregate reactivity rate and the cross-quintile reactivity rates for all factors obtained with Newey-West 
t-statistics are practically the same as those obtained using t-statistics derived from OLS. They follow the same 
patterns, which are described below, and support the same conclusions. 
18 Using Newey-West instead of OLS changes the abnormal return t-statistics but not the regression coefficients. 
Thus, the rolling abnormal returns (dummy coefficients) in the event and non-event groups remain the same. The 
dispersion tests (F-test and Ansari-Bradley) are therefore completely unaffected by choice of OLS versus Newey-
West. 
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and non-event distributions are empirically different, then it is clear that the events impacted the 
firm’s stock price. Such a finding would demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship and establish 
that the market has not ignored the events.  
3.4 Designating stocks as reactive or nonreactive 
From the rolling regressions, we obtain an abnormal return for every trading day within each stock-
year. The set of abnormal returns allows one to assess whether earnings day abnormal returns are 
qualitatively different from non-earnings day abnormal returns. 
We run three different tests on each stock-year’s abnormal returns to determine whether the stock 
exhibited reactivity or nonreactivity to earnings announcements. The first is the Fisher Exact test, 
which tests whether significant abnormal returns are more frequent on event days than on non-
event days. The second is an F-test that evaluates whether the event and non-event samples have 
different variances. Greater stock movement on event days may manifest in higher variance, which 
therefore indicates reactivity. The third test is the Ansari-Bradley test, which also tests whether the 
dispersion of abnormal returns is greater on event days than on all other days. The Ansari-Bradley 
test is a non-parametric test that is robust to alternative distributional assumptions, non-normality 
in particular. 
3.4.1 Fisher Exact Test 
The Fisher Exact test evaluates the null hypothesis that the association between two categorical 
variables is random (the variables are independent) against the alternative that there is a nonrandom 
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association (variables are dependent).19 This test can be described as an odds ratio test, a two 
proportions test, or an incidence rate test. 
For each stock-year, we count how many event day abnormal returns are significant (A) and how 
many are non-significant (B). We also count how many non-event day abnormal returns are 
significant (C) and how many are non-significant (D). The proportion of significant event day 
returns, which is the observed significance incidence rate, is given by A/(A+B). The significance 
incidence rate for non-events is C/(C+D). 
For our application, the Fisher Exact test queries the null hypothesis that the event day incidence 
of significant returns is less than or equal to the non-event day incidence of significant returns. 
When a Fisher Exact test p-value is less than or equal to 5%, one can reject the null hypothesis of 
non-reactivity in favor of the alternative characterization that the stock is reactive. We run the test 
per stock-year observation, to determine whether each particular stock in each year displayed 
reactivity. 
Ferrillo et al. (2004) proposed using a two-proportions Z-test to assess whether a particular stock 
over some period of interest displayed reactivity. We use the Fisher Exact test due to small sample 
considerations. Each stock-year has only four news events, the earnings announcements, which 
may not be plentiful enough for the asymptotic reliability of the Z-test. The Fisher Exact test, on 
 
 
19 See McDonald (2014, pp 77): “The null hypothesis is that the relative proportions of one variable are independent 
of the second variable […]” 
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the other hand, provides exact probability values, even in small samples, and does not rely on large 
sample asymptotics.20 
3.4.2 F-test and Ansari-Bradley test 
We also evaluate stock price reactivity with the F-test and Ansari-Bradley test. Both of these tests 
determine whether abnormal return dispersion differs across the event and non-event samples. 
Greater dispersion of abnormal returns among events days relative to non-event days would show 
that the stock price reacts to information flow. These dispersion tests have been used in security 
litigation to support a finding of reactivity.21 
The F-test compares the sample variance for the event group abnormal returns with the sample 
variance for the non-event group. Under the assumption that logarithmic abnormal returns in each 
group are normally distributed, the ratio of these variances has an F-distribution with degrees of 
freedom (T1-1, T2-1), where T1 is the number of event days in the stock-year, and T2 is the 
number of non-event days in that stock-year. The null hypothesis is that the abnormal return 
variance among event days is less than or equal to the variance among non-event days. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the abnormal return variance among event days is larger than the 
abnormal return variance among non-event days. The null calls for a one-tailed test, and we adopt 
a conventional 5% critical value. A p-value less than 5% compels a conclusion of reactivity. 
 
 
20 The term “small samples” refers to a small number of observations in sub-categories (our A, B, C, D groups 
defined above), not necessarily to the total sample. 
21 For example: In Re JPMorgan Chase & Co. Securities Litigation, In Re Prudential Financial, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, and In Re Questcor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation. 
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While the F-test of variance requires each of the two compared samples (event returns and non-
event returns) to be normally distributed,22 and abundant evidence in the finance literature 
indicates stock returns are not normally distributed,23 the test is nonetheless used as a first-pass to 
assess differences in variance between groups of stock returns. We offer the F-test as a convenient 
comparison of sample dispersions, subject to the caveat that its reliability depends on distribution 
normality, which stock returns often violate. We address the effects of potential non-normality on 
the F-test results by conducting the Ansari-Bradley dispersion test for confirmation.  
Unlike the F-test, the non-parametric Ansari-Bradley test does not require the two samples of stock 
returns to be normally distributed. The test is robust to the presence of sample outliers and 
leptokurtosis. To detect differences in dispersion, Ansari-Bradley requires only that the two 
samples, X=event returns and Y=non-event returns, have the same continuous distributions, with 
equal medians, but potentially different dispersion.24  
Following Ansari and Bradley (1960, p. 1174): “The two samples are ordered in a single joint 
array and ranks are assigned from each end of the joint array towards the middle. The statistic used 
is W, the sum of ranks for the X-sample.” Thus, smaller ranks for event returns would be associated 
to larger realizations in either direction, thus to larger dispersion relative to non-event returns. 
 
 
22 Box (1953, p. 318) indicates that F-tests for mean-differences are robust to non-normality, but F-tests for 
variance-differences are not. 
23 E.g., the well-known textbook by Campbell et al. (1997, p.16) indicates: “But as attractive as the lognormal model 
is, it is not consistent with all the properties of historical stock returns.” They further provide empirical evidence 
(Table 1.1, p. 21) that indexes and individual stocks have significant excess kurtosis and skewness. 
24 Technically, Ansari and Bradley (1960) require that the difference in population medians be known (not 
necessarily the two medians) as, in that case, either one of the series could be appropriately adjusted by the 
difference in medians so that both series satisfy the equal median requisite.  
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Because our definition of reactivity encompasses changes in the distribution of stock returns (e.g., 
median and dispersion, with no prejudice against other moments of the distribution), we do not 
adjust the Ansari-Bradley test for medians, i.e. our Ansari-Bradley test is a test for differences in 
medians, dispersion, or both. Ansari and Bradley (1960, p. 1188) state that when the number of 
members in one group is small relative to the number of members in the other, and no median 
adjustment is made in the samples, then rejection of the null hypothesis may be due to differences 
in the location or dispersion of the distribution. In our study, either way, rejection of the null would 
indicate a difference between the distribution of event and non-event abnormal returns, which 
therefore indicates that the stock reacts to information. 
3.4.3 Examining the relationship between factor values and reactivity 
After labeling each stock-year observation as reactive or nonreactive, we compute the percentage 
of stocks that are reactive in each factor quintile. We test whether there are meaningful and 
significant differences between the percentages of reactive stocks in each factor quintile to 
determine whether reactivity correlates with factor value. 
4. Results and analysis of univariate tests of Cammer/Krogman factor efficacy 
4.1 Design of univariate Cammer/Krogman factor quintile tests 
Each stock-year is identified as reactive or nonreactive based on earnings announcement event 
abnormal returns evaluated alternatively by the Fisher Exact test, an F-test, and the Ansari-Bradley 
test. As reported above, our data comprises 1,483 stocks in 2012; 1,480 in 2013; 1,559 in 2014; 
1,650 in 2015; 1,326 in 2016, and 1,565 in 2017. Some firms appear in all six years while some 
firms in a subset of the years. We stacked the observations from all years to construct a collection 
of 9,063 stock-year observations. We sort all 9,063 observations into ranked quintiles for each 
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factor and count how many stock-year observations within each factor quintile are reactive. We 
then test to determine if there are significant differences in the percentages of reactive stocks 
between factor quintiles. 
4.1.1 Cammer/Krogman factor quintiles with reactivity assessed using the Fisher Exact test 
When reactivity is assessed using the Fisher Exact test, 61% of all 9,063 stock-year observations 
appear to be reactive, with the remaining 39% nonreactive. As shown in Table 2, however, for all 
five Cammer/Krogman factors examined, the percentage of reactive stocks in the quintile 
comprising the largest factor values is significantly different from the percentage of reactive stocks 
in the quintile comprising the smallest factor values. Moreover, the relationships between factor 
value and reactivity is in the predicted direction. The percentage of reactive stocks is significantly 
greater among stocks with greater size, volume, analyst coverage, number of market makers, and 
among stocks with smaller bid-ask spreads.   
We observe in Table 2 that in the quintile of largest market capitalization, 75.5% of the stocks 
were reactive, while in the quintile of smallest stocks only 36.5% were reactive. The quintile with 
the greatest daily volume (turnover) had a reactivity percentage of 64.3%, while the lowest 
turnover quintile had a reactivity percentage of 36.1%. The quintile with the most analysts had a 
reactivity percentage of 75.5%, while the quintile with the least analyst coverage had a reactivity 
percentage of 39.6%. The quintile with the greatest number of market makers had a reactivity 
percentage of 74.2%, while the quintile with the lowest number of market makers had a reactivity 
percentage of 59.7%. The quintile with the narrowest bid-ask spreads had a reactivity rate of 
76.6%, while the quintile with the widest bid-ask spreads had a reactivity rate of 33.2%. All 
reactivity rate differences discussed above were highly statistically significant. 
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For three of the five factors – size, analyst coverage, and bid-ask spread – reactivity progresses 
monotonically, in the anticipated direction, as one moves from one quintile to the next. Moreover, 
all pairwise quintile differences in reactivity percentages were highly statistically significant for 
analyst coverage and bid-ask spread. For size, all pairwise quintile differences were significant 
except for the difference between quintiles 3 and 4. 
The other two factors, volume and market makers showed some pattern instability. The pattern 
among volume quintiles was unstable beyond quintile 3. Moving from lowest turnover, quintile 1, 
to greater turnover up through quintile 3, each successive quintile had a greater reactivity 
percentage, as expected. However, the reactivity rate dipped between quintiles 3 and 4, and dipped 
again between quintiles 4 and 5. The difference between quintiles 3 and 4 is small at 0.6% and not 
significant, but the anomalous decline from quintile 4 to quintile 5 is large at 6.1%, and statistically 
significant. All other pairwise comparisons were highly statistically significant.  
While the reactivity difference between highest and lowest volume quintiles is consistent with 
expectations, the declining reactivity after quintile 3 is intriguing. However, this univariate 
analysis does not take into account the effects of all other factors and interactions among the 
factors.25 Multivariate analysis, presented below, will show how each factor affects the probability 
of a stock being reactive, controlling for all other factors. 
 
 
25 We previously entertained a hypothesis that an interaction between size and volume, measured as turnover, 
interfered with effect of volume on reactivity. We measure volume not as absolute trading shares, but as daily 
turnover of outstanding shares. For two firms with the same measured volume, the smaller firm with fewer 
outstanding shares will have higher turnover so that a size effect might swamp a volume effect among the highest 
turnover stocks. This turned out not to be the case. At the suggestion of the referee, we conducted a double sorting to 
control for size quintile while evaluating reactivity across volume quintiles and found the same hump-shaped pattern 
in volume. We also tried an interaction effect (size and volume) in the logit regression, which proved 
inconsequential as well. 
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The pattern among market maker quintiles is generally consistent with expectations, with an 
exception at the transition between quintiles 1 and 2. Moving from quintile 2 to quintile 5, 
successive quintiles have greater reactivity percentages. However, the transition from quintile 1 to 
quintile 2 stands out as unusual, with significantly lower reactivity (41%) in quintile 2 than in 
quintile 1 (60%). A possible explanation is mismeasurement in the market maker variable. We 
have 837 stock-year observations for which CRSP reported zero market makers. These 
observations are distinct from stocks for which market maker data was unavailable from CRSP. 
As explained above, stocks with unreported market makers were assigned “NA” in the CRSP 
database and were excluded from our study. If zeros correspond to a measurement error rather than 
a true zero value, these “zero-market-maker” stocks, which may actually have an ample number 
of market makers, will erroneously appear in quintile 1, potentially inflating the reactivity rate 
there. To explore this potential explanation, we repeated the market maker factor analysis, 
excluding the stocks assigned a zero market maker value by CRSP.26 
The last panel of Table 2 shows the results of this additional market maker factor analysis. 
Eliminating the zero-market-maker stock-years does make a difference. When including the zero-
market-maker stocks in the study, the reactivity rates for market maker quintiles 1 and 2 were, 
respectively, 60% and 41%. Excluding the zero-market-maker stocks, the reactivity rates for 
market maker quintiles 1 and 2 are respectively 47% and 46%. While there is no significant 
difference in reactivity rates between revised quintiles 1 and 2, there is no counter-intuitive 
 
 
26 We are grateful to the referee for suggesting the exclusion of observations with zero market makers to address the 
aberrant results between market maker quintiles 1 and 2 when including those anomalous observations. 
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significant dip from quintile 1 to quintile 2 with this modification. Beyond quintile 2, reactivity 
grows monotonically as the number of market makers increases. 
4.1.2 Cammer/Krogman factor quintiles with reactivity assessed using the dispersion tests 
When reactivity is assessed with the dispersion tests, we find qualitatively the same results across 
factor quintiles as when reactivity is assessed with the Fisher Exact test. For parsimonious 
presentation, we discuss the general trends while presenting all results in Tables 3 and 4. 
For reactivity assessed with the F-test, the results are presented in Table 3. The F-test finds 75.02% 
of all stock-years are reactive, a substantially higher proportion than reactivity detected by the 
Fisher Exact test. With reactivity designated by the F-test, all factors show significant differences 
in reactivity rates between the highest and lowest quintiles, as was the case when reactivity was 
designated by the Fisher Exact test. Again, size, analyst coverage, and bid-ask spread show a 
monotonic progression in the proportion of reactive stocks in the expected direction. Differences 
between quintiles are for the most part significant.  
As shown in Table 4, when reactivity is assessed with the Ansari-Bradley test, 67% of all stock-
years are reactive, in between the results obtained when using the Fisher Exact test and the F-test. 
The Ansari-Bradley test produced the same pattern of reactivity rates across factor quintiles as did 
the F-test. All factors show significant differences in reactivity rates between the highest and 
lowest quintiles. Once again, size, analyst coverage, and bid-ask spread show a monotonic 
progression in the proportion of reactive stocks, in the expected direction. Differences between 
quintiles are usually significant. 
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In common with the Fisher Exact test results, both the F-test and Ansari-Bradley test results exhibit 
an anomalous decline in reactivity transitioning from market-maker quintile 1 to quintile 2. As was 
the case with the Fisher Exact test results, this anomalous decline disappears when the zero-
market-maker stock-years are excluded. Correcting the apparent variable error, reactivity 
monotonically increases from market maker quintile 1 through 5, for both the F-test and Ansari-
Bradley reactivity designations. This result is presented in the last panel of Tables 3 and 4. 
Also, in common with the Fisher Exact test results, both the F-test and Ansari-Bradley test results 
exhibit a rise and then fall in reactivity rates as volume increases. The decline begins at quintile 4 
for the Ansari-Bradley test specification and at quintile 3 when using the F-test. The hump shaped 
impact of the volume metric on reactivity is consistent across the three reactivity detection tests.27  
4.1.3 Conclusions from factor quintile tests 
The F-test finds more stocks reactive than the Fisher Exact test, with Ansari-Bradley in between. 
For size, analyst coverage, and bid-ask spread, all three tests reveal monotonically increasing 
reactivity rates from one quintile to the next. As size or analyst coverage rises, or as bid-ask spread 
narrows, the reactivity percentage always increases.  
Comparing highest to lowest quintiles for volume and market makers, the pattern is consistent. 
Higher volume or number of market makers increases the proportion of reactive stocks. Within the 
interior quintiles for volume and market makers, however, the pattern is disrupted. For volume, 
 
 
27 As in the previous section, we tried a double sorting procedure to control for size quintile when looking at volume, 
but volume quintile reactivity rates still showed a hump-shaped pattern. This issue is revisited in the multivariate 
analysis section below, examining the effect of each factor controlling for all other factors.  
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reactivity dips after quintile 3 or 4 in all three tests, which is anomalous. Multifactor tests will 
explore whether factor interactions explain this anomaly. For market makers, the anomalous 
significant decline in reactivity rates between quintiles 1 and 2 appears to be due to an error in the 
market maker measure for those stocks reported by CRSP to have zero market makers. When those 
particular observations are excluded, the results for the market maker factor align as expected.  
In sum, the quintile tests generally confirm the Cammer/Krogman factors as dispositive of 
reactivity, regardless of which test is used to assess reactivity. At the aggregate level, we find that 
61% of stocks are reactive with the Fisher Exact test, 75% with the F-test, and 67% with the Ansari-
Bradley test. Does this mean that the remaining stock-years, between 25% and 39% depending on 
the reactivity test, do not respond to information flow and are necessarily inefficient? No. As is 
well known in inferential statistics, failure to reject a null hypothesis does not imply that the null 
hypothesis is true. Here, failure to reject the null hypothesis that a stock did not react to earnings 
announcements does not prove that earnings announcements were ignored by the market or that 
the market was necessarily inefficient.28 
 
 
28 In a forensic setting, it would be appropriate to conduct further analysis on the single stock at issue when confronted 
with apparent nonreactivity. In particular, one would examine the details of the earnings announcements to assess 
whether non-significant reactions were consistent with the nature of the information disseminated. Modest stock price 
movements in reaction to modest news are consistent with market efficiency. In this large sample study, however, it 
is impractical to investigate deeply the details of the earnings announcements for the 25%-39% of stock-years that 
failed to show reactivity via the empirical tests performed, though it is reasonably clear that not all of these stocks 
necessarily trade inefficiently. 
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4.2 Differences in factor characteristics between reactive and nonreactive stocks 
The set of tests described above divided stocks into factor quintiles and then compared the quintiles 
to determine if there were differences in reactivity. We now examine the data from a different 
perspective and conduct a different univariate test. We separate the entire sample of 9,063 stock-
years into reactive and nonreactive groups and compare their Cammer/Krogman factor 
characteristics.  
This examination confirms that the Cammer/Krogman factors are dispositive. In Table 5, panel A, 
we see that of the total 9,063 stock-year observations, 5,489 are reactive and 3,574 nonreactive as 
determined by the Fisher Exact test. The reactive stocks on average are larger, have greater volume, 
more analysts, more market makers, and narrower bid-ask spreads. 
For every factor, the median of the reactive group is significantly different from the median of the 
nonreactive group, per a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. The median size of reactive stocks is $1,007M 
while the median size of the nonreactive stocks is $365.5M. The median volume among the 
reactive stock is 0.73% while for nonreactive stocks the median volume is 0.52%. Median analyst 
coverage is 6.8 analysts for reactive stocks and 4.0 for nonreactive stocks. The median value of 
the number of market makers is 44.4 for reactive stocks and 38.0 for nonreactive stocks. Finally, 
the median bid-ask spread is 0.08% for the reactive stocks, while for nonreactive stocks the median 
bid-ask spread is a much wider 0.22%. 
Table 5, panel B, presents the median factor value analysis, for reactivity determined by the F-test. 
Panel C presents the test results for reactivity determined by the Ansari-Bradley test. All results 
are again significant, and qualitatively the same as the results for the tests where reactivity was 
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determined by the Fisher Exact test. The reactive stocks have statistically significantly greater size, 
volume, analyst coverage, and market makers, and significantly narrower bid-ask spread.29 
While all three tests to detect reactivity – Fisher Exact, F-test, and Ansari-Bradley – produced the 
same qualitative results, the F-test finds a reactivity rate (75%) much higher than the Ansari-
Bradley test (67%) and the Fisher Exact test (61%). However, the F-test requires normality in both 
the event and non-event abnormal return distributions, and return normality or log-normality is 
often rejected in the empirical literature. Furthermore, our event group consists of only 4 
observations per stock-year, which is too few to test reliably for normality. Consequently, while 
the F-test is a common and convenient comparison of sample variances, and serves that purpose 
here, it may produce unreliable population inferences when applied to stock returns. The Ansari-
Bradley test, which does not require return normality, finds reactivity rates in between the Fisher 
Exact test and the F-test, while allowing for differences in dispersion and median, suggesting that 
the high reactivity rates found with the F-test may be caused by the normality assumption. Given 
the robustness and reliability of the Ansari-Bradley test results, and the potential defect in the F-
test application, we present Ansari-Bradley test results and omit F-test results in the remainder of 
the paper. In previous versions of this paper, and with similar data, we found all F-test results to 




29 We did the same analysis using the factor means of reactive and non-reactive groups and obtained qualitatively 
the same results as when using the medians: all group differences are highly significant. We do not report those 
other results to save space and because we focus on the factor median as a threshold in the logit regressions, but a 
table is available upon request. 
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5. Multivariate tests of the Cammer/Krogman factors as drivers of reactivity 
5.1. Logit regression setup: Threshold analysis 
A logit regression can tell us how much each factor contributes to the probability of stock reactivity 
when the factor is above a set threshold rather than below. In a multivariate logit regression, we 
can assess which factors are the strongest drivers of reactivity, controlling for the effects of all 
other factors. 
In the logit model, “Reactivity” is the dependent variable taking on a value of “1” if the stock-year 
observation is reactive and a value of “0” if the stock-year observation is nonreactive. The set of 
independent right-hand-side variables comprises an intercept term and a binary zero-one indicator 
variable for each of the five Cammer/Krogman factors. The indicator variables for size, volume, 
analysts, and market makers each take a value of “1” when the factor is above or equal to a set 
threshold, and a value of “0” if the factor is below that threshold. The indicator variable for bid-
ask spread is constructed in the opposite direction, taking a value of “1” when the factor is below 
the set threshold, and a “0” when the factor is above that threshold. For ease of presentation, 
henceforth, for size, volume, analysts, and market makers, we label as “superior” the region of 
values for each respective factor that is above that factor’s threshold; for bid-ask spread, the 
“superior” region is the range of values below the threshold.  
Thus, the logit regression model is constructed as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 
+ 𝛽4𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑟𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑤 +  𝜀                              (1) 
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With this design, a positive and significant coefficient would indicate that the respective factor 
variable contributes explanatory power for reactivity, above what is explained by the other, 
potentially correlated factors. 
Initially, we set the thresholds for all Cammer/Krogman variables equal to their respective 
medians. Subsequently, we vary the thresholds, for each factor at a time, to tune the model to find 
the most predictive factor threshold values, i.e., the threshold for each factor that maximizes the 
model’s explanatory power. This methodology provides insight into minimum sufficient factor 
levels that increase the probability of stock reactivity to earnings announcements. 
From the total data sample, the unconditional probability of a stock being reactive is 61% when 
we determine reactivity with the Fisher Exact test, or 67% when we determine reactivity with the 
Ansari-Bradley test. Our estimated logit model provides the conditional probability of a stock 
being reactive when all indicators equal 1, i.e., when the stock satisfies all factor tests by having 
all factors in their superior region.30 This probability of reactivity is given by: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑑 = 1) =
exp(𝛽0+𝛽1+𝛽2+𝛽3+𝛽4+𝛽5)
1+exp(𝛽0+𝛽1+𝛽2+𝛽3+𝛽4+𝛽5)
                   (2) 
The probability of a stock being reactive conditional on all indicators equaling zero, i.e., when all 
factors fall outside the superior region is given by:31 
 
 
30 That is, when the stock satisfies all factor tests by having above threshold size, volume, analyst coverage, number 
of market makers, and below threshold bid-ask spread. 
31 Notice that the reactivity probability for a stock-year defined in equation (2) is just the exponential of the 
predicted part of the logit regression divided by one plus the exponential of the predicted part of the logit regression. 
The explanatory variables (factor indicators) are by construction equal to either zero or one. Thus, we can construct 
the reactivity probability for any combination of the five Cammer/Krogman factors as contributing factors (X=1) 
and non-contributing factors (X=0). 
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 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑑 = 0) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽0)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽0)
                                                 (3) 
The marginal contribution of any single factor to probability of reactivity is the change in 
probability when four indicators equal one and the indicator of the scrutinized factor switches from 
zero to one. It is the difference between the probability of reactivity when all factor indicators 
equal 1, given by equation (2), and the probability of reactivity when the scrutinized factor 
indicator equals 0 while holding the other four indicators at 1. 
For the Cammer/Krogman indicator variables on the model’s right-hand-side, we initially set 
factor threshold levels at the median factor values: $720.7M for size, 0.66% daily turnover for 
volume, 5.5 analysts, 41.6 market makers and 0.11% bid-ask spread. These medians, along with 
alternative threshold values, are presented in Table 6. 
5.2 Results from Logit regressions using median thresholds 
Table 7 shows the multivariate logit regressions using factor medians as the factor thresholds for 
the factor indicator variables. Section A shows results when reactivity is determined by the Fisher 
Exact test. From the first three columns, we conclude that all coefficients have the correct sign 
consistent with expectations, and all but the size coefficient are significant. In the lower panel, the 
adjusted generalized R-squared is 12.09%.32 We observe that while 61% of all stock-years are 
reactive, for stocks with all factors in their superior region relative to their medians, the proportion 
rises to 79%. Among stock-years that have all factors outside the superior region relative to their 
 
 
32 We use the adjusted generalized R-squared of Nagelkerke (1991), which is a modification of the Cox and Snell R-
squared. In a previous version, to measure goodness of fit we used the correlation between the binary dependent and 
the fitted value, which is the square root of the MacFadden pseudo R-squared. The Cox-Snell R-squared formula is a 
direct generalization of the OLS R-squared. Nagelkerke’s correction guarantees a range between 0 and 1. 
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medians, 41% are reactive. We conclude that Cammer/Krogman factors as a group are dispositive 
of reactivity. 
The last column of section A shows the marginal contribution of each factor to the probability of 
reactivity. The largest marginal probability contribution corresponds to the bid-ask spread at 
16.26%, which is highly statistically significant. The marginal contribution to reactivity 
probability of the size factor, by contrast, is 1.54%, which is not statistically significant. The 
marginal contribution of analyst coverage, volume and market makers lie between 4.1% and 6.3%, 
which are all statistically significant but substantially lower than the bid-ask spread contribution. 
Section B shows results when reactivity is identified by the Ansari-Bradley test. Regression results 
are qualitatively similar to section A, so we focus our discussion on the reactivity probabilities and 
marginal probabilities. A stock has a reactivity probability of 84% when all indicators equal 1, but 
only 48% when all indicators equal 0. Comparing these numbers with the overall unconditional 
sample reactivity probability of 67%, we conclude that the Cammer/Krogman factors are 
dispositive of reactivity. Furthermore, the largest contributing factor to the probability of reactivity 
(holding all other factor values above the median) is again bid-ask spread with 10.6% while the 
smallest contributor is again size with 1.54%, which is not statistically significant. In a middle 
range, we have the marginal contributions of volume, number of analysts, and market makers at 
5.1%, 3.3% and 6.4%, respectively.  
The multivariate median threshold tests indicate that the set of Cammer/Krogman factors is 
collectively dispositive of reactivity, with bid-ask spread providing the most explanatory power, 
and size being statistically non-significant. The higher marginal contribution from analyst 
coverage relative to size is consistent with the finding in Busse and Green (2002) that analyst 
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coverage can compensate for small size in fostering reactivity. As long as a firm has broad analyst 
coverage, its size makes less of a difference with respect to reactivity.  
However, care must be taken in interpreting these results, especially the non-significance of size 
across regressions. We posit that it may be the case that once a company reaches a certain 
minimally necessary size level, further increases in this metric do not make it more reactive to 
information flows. If this is the case, the arbitrary choice of median level for the indicator threshold 
could be misplaced and responsible for the lack of statistical significance of the size factor in the 
median threshold tests. We test this hypothesis in the next section, where we investigate optimized 
factor thresholds – the level that maximize the explanatory power of the model and its component 
factors.33 
5.3 Optimized thresholds 
We re-run the logit regressions described in the previous section, but this time we set the factor 
indicator thresholds for four of the factors at their respective median values, and vary the threshold 
for the one remaining factor to locate the threshold level at which the regression achieves the most 
significant coefficient for that particular factor. Given that the prior tests establish that the 
Cammer/Krogman factors taken together are informative, and that most are individually 
 
 
33 We also investigated inserting year fixed-effects dummies in the logit regressions. Although each year dummy 
was significant, its effect on the factor coefficients and on the respective factor marginal probabilities was negligible 
compared to the regressions without the year dummies. This examination confirms that neither reactivity in general 
nor the dispositive nature of the Cammer/Krogman factors changed much over time. We thank the referee for this 
recommendation. Because the logit regressions had different intercepts on different years, the factor coefficients as 
well as the marginal probabilities of the factors could have changed. As they did not, to focus this study on the 
Cammer/Krogman factors, we maintain our logit specification without year dummies. Nonetheless, a table of these 
additional results is available upon request. 
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significant, the idea behind this experiment is to design Cammer/Krogman factor tests that are 
maximally dispositive.  
We begin by setting the indicator variable threshold for the one subject factor at a low level and 
run the logit regression. We then slide the subject factor’s indicator threshold up to a higher value 
and rerun the logit regression. We continue until we span the range of possible values. We name 
this process the “slide” tests, as varying each threshold along its range from lowest to highest, in 
search of the threshold that provides maximum significance (largest t-statistic) of the subject 
factor, is akin to sliding a switch for a control variable in search of the optimal setting. 
For size, volume and bid-ask spread, which are essentially continuous variables, we sort the 9,063 
stock-year observations from smallest to largest, and test in the range between the 10th and 90th 
percentiles, i.e., between observations 907 and 8,157. For each successive iteration, we slide the 
threshold up by one observation.  
For the analyst coverage and market maker factors, we consider all possible integer values between 
the minimum possible value and the 90th percentile value. For number of analysts, our range is 
between two and 18. For market makers, the range is between one and 55. These ranges for analysts 
and market makers represent discrete values between approximately the 10th and 90th 
percentiles.34 Table 6 presents the range of values tested as thresholds for each factor. 
 
 
34 Factors may take non-integer values in the sample. If we have one analyst for one quarter and two analysts for the 
other three quarters, the stock-year annual average would be 1.75. We do not round, e.g., a stock-year with 1.75 
analysts would be below a threshold of 2. 
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As an example, the regression model searching for the optimized size threshold, given that the 
other factors’ indicator variables are set at their respective medians, (as Eq. 1) is as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑗)𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑤 
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽5𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑟𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 +  𝜀; 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑗 = 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑗 = 907 𝑡𝑜 8,157              (5) 
 
For each factor at a time, from the set of all possible logit regressions estimated over the range of 
threshold values, we identify which threshold produces the highest t-statistic for the subject factor 
coefficient. We call this factor threshold that makes the factor in question most significant, the 
optimized threshold. A positive and significant factor coefficient is necessary for that factor to 
have a significant marginal probability contribution.35 
For each factor, we graph significance level against threshold level to assist the analysis with visual 
representations. These graphs are presented in Figure 1, panels A to E. Of particular interest is the 
region of threshold levels where the factor is significant. This presentation allows us to evaluate 
what ranges of the factors significantly increase the probability of stock reactivity, controlling for 
the other respective factors, and evaluate in which ranges each factor may be inconsequential.  
 
 
35 If the factor coefficient () is positive but not significant, its 95% confidence interval (-low, -high) includes 0. 
Correspondingly, the factor marginal probability, that uses its , will be positive, but a 95% confidence interval of 
that marginal probability, using (-low, -high), will have negative values and include 0 as well, meaning that its 
marginal reactivity probability is not significant. We can associate regions of a factor value having a positive and 
significant logit regression coefficient with a positive and significant marginal probability contribution.  
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5.4 Slide Test results 
Table 8 shows the range of factor threshold values that produce significant probability of stock 
reactivity. Figure 1 plots the t-statistics of the slide test coefficients obtained from the logit 
regression. These plots illustrate that the relationship between factor threshold and factor 
significance is smooth. For every factor, there are well defined ranges of significance associated 
with alternative threshold levels. When a logit regression factor threshold is set outside the range 
of significance, the factor will appear nonsignificant as a determinant of reactivity. For every 
factor, however, there is a wide range of values in which the factor is a significant driver of 
reactivity. Table 8 presents for each factor, the first and last threshold values for which the factor 
indicator is significant in the logit regression, and further identifies the threshold level at which 
factor significance is maximized.  
Panel A shows the results when we identify reactivity with the Fisher Exact test. For size, the range 
of significance is from $95.14M to $633.40M, with maximum significance at $224.11M. Recall 
that the median firm size is $720.73M, so the slide test explains why size appears non-significant 
in the median test. The median was well-above the range of significance. Setting the size cutoff 
lower produces a size indicator variable that significantly explains reactivity. Apparently, among 
large stocks, variation in size does not matter, as for those stocks size is not a significant 




36 We note that in Figure 1, panel A (Size), there is a small group of scattered observations with large market 
capitalization (251 non-contiguous points) that are marginally significant. We dismissed these few observations as 
they are entirely consistent with chance: In a study with 9,000+ data points, using a 5% significance test, we may 
find about 450 significant observations scattered throughout the sample just by chance. We focus on the large region 
of 4,200+ contiguous observations of significant points (almost half of the sample) for our discussion in the text.  
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For volume, the range of significance is between 0.22% and 0.76% daily turnover, with maximum 
significance at 0.23%. Daily turnover of 0.23% is approximately 1.15% weekly turnover. The 
conventional wisdom in courts is that a 1% weekly turnover compels a presumption of efficiency, 
while 2% weekly turnover allows a strong presumption.37 Our results are consistent with that 
wisdom. We find that the optimized volume threshold, the one producing the most significant 
indicator variable, is 0.30%, corresponding to 1.5% turnover per week. Furthermore, the 
significance range includes the median volume of 0.66%, so a median test is reasonable. 
For the bid-ask spread, the range of significance is between 0.03% and 0.89%, with maximum 
significance at 0.21%. The median bid-ask spread of 0.11% is inside that range. While a higher 
threshold level produces a more significant indicator variable, a median bid-ask spread test is 
reasonable and dispositive.  
For analyst coverage, the range of significance is between two and 11 analysts, with maximum 
significance at three analysts. Median analyst coverage is 5.5 analysts. Barber et al. (1994) 
concluded that one or two analysts were enough to indicate efficiency. Our results are consistent 
in that a threshold of two analysts produces a significant indicator variable, but our results also 
indicate that a threshold of three analysts produces a better indicator test. 
Finally, for market makers, the range of significance is between 24 and 50, with maximum 
significance at 39, while the median is 41.6 analysts. The conventional wisdom in courts, based 
on Bromberg and Lowenfels (1988), is that five market makers would allow a modest presumption 
of reactivity and that ten market makers compel a substantial presumption. Our results reject this 
 
 
37 The Cammer court cites Bromberg and Lowenfels (1988). 
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conventional wisdom as thresholds in the range of five to ten analysts produce a non-significant 
indicator in our slide test. Over time the number of market makers has increased substantially for 
most stocks, so it is not surprising that a threshold level deemed dispositive more than thirty years 
ago may no longer be so. The dispositive threshold level of market makers is now higher. 
For every factor, the threshold that maximizes coefficient significance also maximizes regression 
fit as given by the adjusted generalized R-squared. Panel B shows similar results when we identify 
stock reactivity with the Ansari-Bradley test. 
5.5 Logit regression using optimized thresholds  
Finally, we estimate the multivariate logit regression using the optimized thresholds identified in 
the Slide tests. Table 9 presents these results. While factor significance was maximized by varying 
factor thresholds individually, when assembled into a single regression model using all optimized 
thresholds, the size factor becomes significant with both tests, but analyst coverage loses its 
significance when using the Ansari-Bradley test. Therefore, every factor contributes explanatory 
power predicting whether a stock will be reactive or nonreactive, with analyst coverage showing 
weaker results than the other factors. Furthermore, the adjusted generalized R-squared is higher 
for each regression relative to its counterpart in Table 7 (median thresholds). 
For reactivity designated by the Fisher Exact test, the largest and most significant coefficient once 
again is on bid-ask spread. Bid-ask spread has the largest marginal probability of reactivity, at 
20.7%.38 The second largest marginal probability is 18.0%, for volume. The other marginal 
 
 
38 A stock that has its other four factors in the respective superior regions (as defined by the optimized thresholds) 
has a 21% larger probability of reactivity if its bid-ask spread lies above the optimized bid-ask spread threshold 
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probabilities are 4.6% for size, 4.4% for analyst coverage, and 4.0% for market makers. Each factor 
is significant and therefore dispositive of reactivity. The results are similar when reactivity is 
designated by the Ansari-Bradley test – very large marginal probabilities for bid-ask spread and 
volume (both at 14.7%), with size and market makers having substantially lower but still 
significant marginal probabilities, and with analyst coverage being non-significant.39 
Among the group of stocks whose factor values all lie on the superior sides of the thresholds, the 
percentage that are reactive is 73.5% for the Fisher Exact test and 79.1% for the Ansari-Bradley 
test. These percentages are dramatically and significantly greater than the corresponding reactivity 
rates for the group of stocks whose factor values all lie on the inferior sides of the thresholds: 
21.0% for the Fisher Exact test, and 31.9% for Ansari-Bradley test. The Cammer/Krogman factors 
are highly dispositive of reactivity, and proper calibration makes them even more so, with weaker 
evidence for analyst coverage. 
The spreads in reactivity proportions between stocks that satisfy and stocks that do not satisfy the 
factor threshold tests are far greater when optimized thresholds are used as opposed to when 
thresholds are set to medians.40 The adjusted generalized R-squared is similarly greater for the 
 
 
rather than below. Similar interpretations apply to the marginal probabilities of the other factors. Marginal 
probability is the probability improvement due to the subject factor satisfying rather than failing its respective 
threshold test, assuming the stock satisfies the other four factor threshold tests. 
39 We investigated inserting year dummies in the logit regressions to see whether the relative importance or 
significance of the factors was robust to this alternative modeling. Although each year’s dummy was significant (as 
was the case in the median threshold regressions), changes in the factor coefficients and respective marginal 
probabilities were negligible. To focus this study on the Cammer/Krogman factors, we present the results only for 
the modeling without year dummies. Nonetheless, these alternative results are available upon request.  
40 Note that it is the spread in reactivity rates between stocks that satisfy the factor tests versus stocks that do not 
satisfy the factor tests that measures the power of the test to reliably differentiate reactive from nonreactive stocks. 
The reactivity rate can be raised arbitrarily high by raising the factor thresholds indiscriminately. But, setting the 
bars arbitrarily high does not produce a test that best differentiates reactive from nonreactive stocks. 
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optimized model than for the model built using medians as thresholds. The greater explanatory 
power of the multivariate regression model using the optimized thresholds indicates that while 
tests based on medians are informative, the relationships between factors and reactivity are 
apparently such that thresholds other than medians produce better differentiating tests. 
The multivariate regression model in Barber et al. (1994) used parametric values for all 
explanatory factors, while our model uses binary variables indicating whether a factor is above or 
below a set threshold level. In their multivariate analysis, size, market makers, and bid-ask spread 
were not significant. Our model, by contrast, finds these factors significant. A comparison of these 
results suggests that for at least size and market makers, what matters is that a stock has a sufficient 
level, which facilitates reactivity, and that variation in the factor magnitude beyond or below the 
sufficient level provides less benefit. 
6. Conclusions 
We study the relationship between the Cammer/Krogman factors and stock price reactivity to 
earnings announcements as detected by the collective event study tests used in class action 
securities litigation. We find that the Cammer/Krogman factors are indeed significant drivers of 
stock price reactivity. Stocks whose factor values lie above median size, volume, analyst coverage, 
and number of market makers, and whose bid-ask spread is below median, are far more likely to 
exhibit reactivity to earnings announcements than stocks without those factor characteristics. 
Calibration of the thresholds to optimize statistical significance of each factor produces even more 
dispositive factor tests, with weaker evidence for analyst coverage using the Ansari-Bradly test. 
Empirical proof of reactivity demonstrates the cause and effect relationship between information 
and stock price movements that Courts consider as evidence of market efficiency. Our findings 
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that the Cammer/Krogman factors are generally dispositive of reactivity supports the widespread 
use by courts of the Cammer/Krogman factors as indicia of market efficiency. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for 2012-2017 
                        
                                
  Size ($ Million) Daily Volume No. Analysts Market Makers Bid-Ask Spread 
  Min Max Median Min Max Median Min Max Median Min Max Median Min Max Median 
Full 
Sample 
$2.6 $780,679 $720.7 0.0000 0.1765 0.0066 1.0 47.8 5.5 0.0 79.5 41.6 0.0001 0.1321 0.0011 
Quint 1 $2.6 $191.6 $95.1 0.0000 0.0033 0.0022 1.0 2.5 1.5 0.0 26.8 3.0 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 
Quint 2 $192.1 $476.3 $304.8 0.0033 0.0054 0.0044 2.5 4.3 3.5 26.8 38.1 33.6 0.0005 0.0008 0.0006 
Quint 3 $476.8 $1,089.7 $720.5 0.0054 0.0080 0.0066 4.3 6.8 5.5 38.1 45.2 41.6 0.0008 0.0016 0.0011 
Quint 4 $1,089.8 $2,964.5 $1,707.1 0.0080 0.0126 0.0100 6.8 12.0 8.8 45.2 51.3 48.2 0.0016 0.0041 0.0024 
Quint 5 $2,966 $780,679 $7,023 0.0126 0.1765 0.0177 12.0 47.8 18.0 51.3 79.5 55.4 0.0041 0.1321 0.0089 
                                
Total number of firm/year observations in 2012-2017 (6 years) = 9,063                 
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Table 2. Proportion Reactive Stocks per Fisher test during 2012-17                 
A. Size               D. Market Makers           
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063 
Prop Reactive 0.3648 0.5367 0.6794 0.6922 0.7551 0.6056   Prop Reactive 0.5966 0.4060 0.5977 0.6856 0.7424 0.6056 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.9460 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.4043 0.0000     Q3 vs 0.9460 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.4043 1 0.0000     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0002   
                              
B. Volume               E. Market Makers Above Zero         
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,646 8,226 
Prop Reactive 0.3609 0.6122 0.7092 0.7033 0.6426 0.6056   Prop Reactive 0.4711 0.4602 0.6389 0.6960 0.7400 0.6013 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.5294 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0589     Q2 vs 0.5294 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.6963 0.0000     Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0005 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.6963 1 0.0001     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 1 0.0051   
                              
C. Number of Analysts             F. Bid Ask             
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063 
Prop Reactive 0.3962 0.5405 0.6280 0.7088 0.7546 0.6056   Prop Reactive 0.7655 0.7325 0.6821 0.5163 0.3320 0.6056 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.0221 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q2 vs 0.0221 1 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000     Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0009 1 0.0000 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0019     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0000   
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Table 3. Proportion Reactive Stocks per F-test of variances during 2012-17             
A. Size               D. Market Makers           
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063 
Prop Reactive 0.5304 0.7170 0.8240 0.8246 0.8549 0.7502   Prop Reactive 0.7395 0.5797 0.7517 0.8268 0.8533 0.7502 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.4016 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.9591 0.0111     Q3 vs 0.4016 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.9591 1 0.0128     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0297   
                              
B. Volume               E. Market Makers Above Zero         
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,646 8,226 
Prop Reactive 0.5552 0.7766 0.8394 0.8246 0.7551 0.7502   Prop Reactive 0.6109 0.6505 0.7818 0.8316 0.8548 0.7459 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.0189 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0003 0.1262     Q2 vs 0.0189 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.2334 0.0000     Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0003 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0003 0.2334 1 0.0000     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 1 0.0674   
                              
C. Number of Analysts             F. Bid Ask             
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063 
Prop Reactive 0.5745 0.7022 0.7776 0.8378 0.8588 0.7502   Prop Reactive 0.8664 0.8566 0.8240 0.7077 0.4964 0.7502 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.3905 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q2 vs 0.3905 1 0.0073 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000     Q3 vs 0.0004 0.0073 1 0.0000 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0786     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0000   
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Table 4. Proportion Reactive Stocks per Ansari-Bradley test during 2012-17             
A. Size               D. Market Makers           
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063 
Prop Reactive 0.4608 0.6062 0.7467 0.7386 0.8009 0.6706   Prop Reactive 0.6462 0.4881 0.6672 0.7375 0.8141 0.6706 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.1838 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.5755 0.0001     Q3 vs 0.1838 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.5755 1 0.0000     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0000   
                              
B. Volume               E. Market Makers Above Zero         
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,646 8,226 
Prop Reactive 0.4387 0.6713 0.7483 0.7683 0.7264 0.6706   Prop Reactive 0.5258 0.5471 0.6991 0.7477 0.8190 0.6678 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.2212 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003     Q2 vs 0.2212 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.1598 0.1337     Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0018 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.1598 1 0.0037     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 1 0.0000   
                              
C. Number of Analysts            F. Bid Ask             
'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All'   'Quintile' 'Q1' 'Q2' 'Q3' 'Q4' 'Q5' 'All' 
Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063   Number Obs 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,813 1,813 9,063 
Prop Reactive 0.4823 0.6084 0.6921 0.7678 0.8025 0.6706   Prop Reactive 0.8013 0.7777 0.7445 0.6040 0.4258 0.6706 
P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences   P-value of two-sample t-test for quintile proportion differences 
Q1 vs 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q1 vs 1 0.0813 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Q2 vs 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     Q2 vs 0.0813 1 0.0190 0.0000 0.0000   
Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000     Q3 vs 0.0000 0.0190 1 0.0000 0.0000   
Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0108     Q4 vs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0000   
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Table 5. Differences in Median Factor Value for Reactive vs Non-Reactive Stocks, 2012-2017       
                          
    Full Sample   Reactive Sample   Non-Reactive Sample     Reactive - NonReactive 
A. Reactivity Measured per Fisher Exact Test                 
    Median Obs   Median Obs   Median Obs   Median Diff  P-value 
[1] 
Size ($Million)   $720.7 9,063   $1,007.4 5,489   $365.5 3,574   $641.9 3.7E-154 
Daily Volume [2]   0.0066 9,063   0.0073 5,489   0.0052 3,574   0.0021 5.7E-75 
Analysts   5.5 9,063   6.8 5,489   4.0 3,574   2.8 1.1E-135 
MktMkr   41.6 9,063   44.4 5,489   38.0 3,574   6.4 1.2E-55 
BidAsk Spread   0.0011 9,063   0.0008 5,489   0.0022 3,574   -0.0014 2.3E-204 
                          
B. Reactivity Measured per F-Variance Test                   
    Median Obs   Median Obs   Median Obs   Median Diff  P-value 
Size ($Million)   $720.7 9,063   $901.1 6,799   $297.4 2,264   $603.7 5.0E-128 
Daily Volume   0.0066 9,063   0.0070 6,799   0.0050 2,264   0.0020 6.0E-48 
Analysts   5.5 9,063   6.3 6,799   3.8 2,264   2.5 2.0E-113 
MktMkr   41.6 9,063   43.5 6,799   36.8 2,264   6.7 1.3E-49 
BidAsk Spread   0.0011 9,063   0.0009 6,799   0.0027 2,264   -0.0018 1.1E-173 
                          
C. Reactivity Measured per Ansari-Bradley Test               
    Median Obs   Median Obs   Median Obs   Median Diff  P-value 
Size ($Million)   $720.7 9,063   $942.8 6,078   $350.4 2,985   $592.4 1.5E-126 
Daily Volume   0.0066 9,063   0.0073 6,078   0.0049 2,985   0.0024 2.1E-88 
Analysts   5.5 9,063   6.5 6,078   4.0 2,985   2.5 1.4E-120 
MktMkr   41.6 9,063   44.0 6,078   37.4 2,985   6.7 1.7E-63 
BidAsk Spread   0.0011 9,063   0.0009 6,078   0.0023 2,985   -0.0014 2.8E-165 
                          
[1] The p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon ranksum test for the null that the median difference is zero.   
[2] Daily Volume is turnover                     
 




Table 6. Threshold Values For Each Factor Used in the Logit Regression   
                
A. Median Factor Values           
    Size $Mill Vol (daily) Analysts MktMkr BidAsk   
    720.73 0.0066 5.5 41.6 0.0011   
                
B. Grid of Factor Thresholds         
    Size $Mill Vol (daily) Analysts MktMkr BidAsk   
From   95.14 0.0022 2 1 0.0003   
To   7,023.45 0.0177 18 55 0.0089   
                
Notes: We sort each factor observations from smallest (1) to largest (9,063):  
Size, volume and bid-ask spread are continuous so they don’t have observation ties 
 (if we look at enough decimals). The grid of thresholds for Size, Vol and Bid-Ask 
spans values from sorted observation 907 (10th percentile) to sorted observation  
8,157 (90th percentile), which factor values are reported above.   
                
For Number of Analysts and Market Makers, the range of values is narrow so 
that we use a discrete grid of thresholds. For Number of Analysts, the grid spans 
from 2 to 18. For Market Makers, the grid spans from 1 to 55.     
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Table 7. Logit Regression: Reactivity Indicator vs Factor Median Threshold Indicator     
                      
    A. Reactivity per Fisher Exact Test   B. Reactivity per Ansari-Bradley Test 
    Coeff Std Err Tstat 
Marg. 
Prob.   Coeff Std Err Tstat 
Marg. 
Prob. 
Intcpt   -0.3816 0.0372 -10.25     -0.0807 0.0371 -2.17   
SizeLarge   0.0903 0.0691 1.31 0.0154   0.1087 0.0719 1.51 0.0154 
VolLarge   0.2327 0.0495 4.70 0.0413   0.3325 0.0513 6.48 0.0507 
AnalystsLarge   0.2308 0.0576 4.00 0.0409   0.2258 0.0600 3.76 0.0333 
MktMkrLarge   0.3475 0.0501 6.93 0.0635   0.4097 0.0521 7.86 0.0640 
BidAskLow   0.8031 0.0678 11.84 0.1626   0.6347 0.0709 8.95 0.1060 
                      
Adj Gen R2   0.1209         0.1085       
                      
Reactivity Rate for:                     
Full Sample   0.6056         0.6706       
All Factor Indicators =1   0.7897         0.8363       
All Factor Indicators =0   0.4057         0.4798       
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Table 8. Range of Values Increasing Reactivity Identified per Test         
                    
A. Fisher Exact Test 
                  
    
First Significant  
Threshold T-statistic 






Size ($Million)   $95.14  6.64   $633.40  1.96   $224.11  9.65 
Daily Volume   0.0022 11.36   0.0076 1.98   0.0023 11.78 
BidAsk Spread   0.0003 4.05   0.0089 10.14   0.0021 17.25 
Analysts   2 7.12   11 2.40   3 7.31 
MktMkr   24 2.55   50 2.54   39 8.15 
                    
                    
B. Ansari-Bradley Test                 
    
First Significant 
Threshold T-statistic 






Size ($Million)   $95.14  6.25   $695.57  1.97   $260.35  8.53 
Daily Volume   0.0022 11.23   0.0099 1.97   0.0029 12.52 
BidAsk Spread   0.0003 3.38   0.0089 9.71   0.0023 14.82 
Analysts   2 5.97   11 2.54   3 6.02 
MktMkr   20 2.09   55 3.55   40 8.87 
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Table 9. Logit regression: Reactivity Indicator vs Best Factor Threshold Indicator         
                        
    A. Reactivity per Fisher Exact Test   B. Reactivity per Ansari-Bradley Test   
    Coeff Std Err Tstat 
Marg. 
Prob.   Coeff Std Err Tstat 
Marg. 
Prob.   
Intcpt   -1.3228 0.0804 -16.45     -0.7572 0.0606 -12.49     
SizeLarge   0.2224 0.0771 2.88 0.0455   0.2117 0.0775 2.73 0.0372   
VolLarge   0.8012 0.0855 9.38 0.1804   0.7379 0.0683 10.81 0.1470   
BidAskLow   0.9083 0.0695 13.06 0.2070   0.7383 0.0756 9.77 0.1471   
AnalystsLarge   0.2137 0.0644 3.32 0.0436   0.1197 0.0653 1.83 0.0205   
MktMkrLarge   0.1989 0.0509 3.91 0.0405   0.2790 0.0532 5.24 0.0499   
                        
Adj Gen R2   0.1542         0.1401         
                        
Reactivity Rate for:                       
Full Sample   0.6056         0.6706         
All Factor Indicators =1   0.7353         0.7907         
All Factor Indicators =0   0.2104         0.3193         
 
  









Figure 1, A-E. Sequential T-statistics for factor coefficient in slide-test logit regression 
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